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A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY: ASYLUM FOR 
TRADITIONALLY MARRIED SPOUSES
Tamika S. Laldee*
In Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Second Circuit defied ten 
years of precedent by holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) does not automat-
ically provide asylum eligibility to the spouses or unmarried partners of 
individuals who have been forced to undergo abortions or sterilizations 
under China’s coercive family planning policies. This Note argues that 
Lin’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(42) was correct, though misplaced, for the 
particular facts of that case.  Furthermore, this Note concludes that, based 
on the clear circuit split that has been fortified by Lin, lawmakers should 
clarify the statutory requirements for asylum. This Note proposes that au-
tomatic asylum eligibility should ultimately be extended to legally married 
couples and cohabitating, traditionally married couples (who would be 
married but for China’s age requirement for marriage) because such rela-
tionships possess presumptions of paternity and commitment that are con-
sistent with the family unit.   
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government claims that the guiding principle of the abortion 
program is ‘voluntarism,’ but there was nothing voluntary about the 
process I observed when living in a Chinese village in 1980. It involved 
subjecting pregnant women, many very close to term, to exhausting morn-
ing-to-night ‘study sessions,’ levying heavy penalties on them and their 
families, and the actual incarceration of those who still proved recalcitrant. 
Nor does the description ‘voluntary’ adequately encompass the reports that 
have come out of China since then of pregnant women being handcuffed, 
thrown into hog cages and taken to operating tables of rural clinics. 
—Steven Mosher, President of the Population Research Institute1
 *  Executive Notes Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. B.S., 
Syracuse University (2006); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law (2009). 
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tion to pursue my goals and providing me with the opportunities I have received. To my 
parents, Gloria and Stephen, thank you for your love and support. Sincerest thanks to Ken-
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The birth of a child is widely considered to be not only a joyous oc-
casion but also a fundamental human right, which is recognized by the 
United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and implied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 Any fa-
vorable sentiments surrounding a pregnancy, however, may be stifled by 
unfortunate consequences when the pregnancy is “unauthorized” under the 
family planning policies of the People’s Republic of China (China).3 When 
a couple has an unauthorized pregnancy in China, they risk exposure to the 
coercive population control practices of forced abortion and sterilization.4
In response to such activity, the United States has expressed its 
deep commitment “to upholding the liberty and dignity of human life” and 
its strong and absolute opposition to “the practices of coercive abortions and 
sterilizations.”5 In 1996, Congress amended section 1101(a)(42) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA) to broaden the definition of refugee 
under the statute.6 The new definition grants automatic asylum eligibility to 
victims of forced abortions or involuntary sterilizations and specifically 
1 Steven Mosher, How China Uses U.N. Aid for Forced Abortions, WALL ST. J., May 13, 
1985, at 23. Mosher described his observations after doing educational work and living in 
rural China in 1980. See Forced Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View from the 
Inside, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, 
House Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa49740.000/hfa49740_0f.htm [hereinafter 
View from the Inside]. Although Mosher recalled forced abortions and sterilizations that 
occurred in 1980, reports of coercive practices in China due to China’s population control 
policies continue today. See Associated Press, U.S.: Infanticide and Forced Abortions Ram-
pant in China, NEWSMAX.COM, Dec. 15, 2004, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articleE
s/2004/12/15/112856.shtml [hereinafter Infanticide and Forced Abortions Rampant in Chi-
na].  
2 See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 922 n.2 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg, J., concur-
ring); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (proclaiming that persons “have 
the right to marry and found a family”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1968) (acknowledging the right to 
privacy, family, and home, and the right to marry and found a family); Kyle R. Rabkin, 
Comment, The Zero-Child Policy: How the Board of Immigration and Appeals Discrimi-
nates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing from Coercive Family Planning Measures,
101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 965, 965 (2007) (arguing that per se marriage eligibility should be ex-
tended to non-legally married, cohabiting partners of victims of coercive family planning 
policies, regardless of whether they were married in traditional Chinese ceremonies or not).  
3 See View from the Inside, supra note 1. Unauthorized pregnancies are those pregnan-
cies that are not approved by the Chinese government and do not comply with China’s popu-
lation control policies. See infra Part I.  
4 See Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration: One-
Child Policy in China, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee (Dec. 
14, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/39823.htm.
5 Id.
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). 
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provides refugee status to direct victims of “a coercive population control 
program.”7
Although INA § 1101(a)(42) refers only to individuals who have 
personally endured forced abortions or involuntary sterilizations, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held, 8 in the 1997 case of In re C-Y-Z-,9 that 
the spouses of victims of coercive population control practices automatical-
ly qualify for asylum as refugees.10 Although the Third, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits have consistently accepted the BIA’s interpretation of section 
1101(a)(42),11 the Second Circuit recently defied ten years of precedent by 
holding that neither a spouse nor an unmarried partner is automatically en-
titled to refugee status based on a partner’s forced abortion or sterilization.12
By finding that the BIA and the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits incor-
rectly interpreted section 1101(a)(42)  as extending refugee status to the 
partners (e.g., legally married spouses and traditionally married partners) of 
the persecuted, the Second Circuit has created a split among the circuits.13
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 1101(a)(42) has also prompt-
ed Congressional support for an amendment to section 1101(a)(42)  that 
would extend refugee status to the “legally recognized spouse[s]” of “per-
sons who have been forced to abort [a] pregnancy or undergo [an] involun-
tary sterilization.”14
Although United States immigration law currently provides foreign-
nationals who have been directly victimized by coercive population control 
policies of foreign governments a chance to obtain refugee status, there is 
no similar opportunity for the spouses of victims of population control poli-
cies. This Note argues that Congress and the courts should expand the scope 
of asylum to include the legally married spouses and traditionally married, 
cohabiting partners of victims of coercive population control programs. Part 
I provides an overview of the evolution of China’s family planning policies. 
Part II examines the legislative evolution of asylum law in response to those 
policies. Part III explores the BIA’s decision to extend per se asylum eligi-
bility to husbands based on the persecution of their wives in China in C-Y-
Z- as well as how the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have approached 
7 Id.
8 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) “is the highest administrative body for inter-
preting and applying immigration laws.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2008) (hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
9 See In re C-Y-Z-, at 919-20. 
10 Id. 
11 See infra note 98 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding). 
12 See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 2007). 
13 See En Banc Matter of C-y-Zmanadamusmandamus, CONN. L. TRIBUNE, July 23, 2007. 
14 See H.R. 3552, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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C-Y-Z-, the Second Circuit’s request for clarification of C-Y-Z-, and the 
BIA’s subsequent clarification of C-Y-Z-.15 Part IV analyzes the Second 
Circuit’s unprecedented determination that neither spouses nor unmarried 
partners are per se eligible for asylum. Part IV also discusses the events 
precipitated by the Second Circuit’s decision. Finally, Part V argues that the 
Second Circuit was correct in its interpretation of section 1101(a)(42) . Part 
V also recommends that section 1101(a)(42) be amended to extend automat-
ic asylum eligibility to legally married spouses as well as to partners in co-
habiting, traditional marriages who would be legally married but for China’s 
coercive family planning policies.  
I. BACKGROUND
Family planning has been practiced in China for more than twenty-
five years. In 1979, Chinese leader Deng Xioping encouraged the concept of 
family planning legislation and established the one-child policy to curb the 
population growth of communist China and conserve scarce resources.16
Although the one-child policy was initially designed as a temporary meas-
ure, the Chinese government has declared that the policy will continue 
through the middle of the twenty-first century.17 Part A of this section pro-
vides a brief overview of China’s one-child policy. Part B examines how the 
Chinese government enforces its population control policies, highlighting 
both the legally recognized, noncoercive techniques openly used by the 
government and the illegally employed, coercive practices covertly applied 
by some Chinese authorities. 
A.  China’s One-Child Policy  
Although China’s family planning policy is often called the “one-
child policy,” this term is a misnomer. While China’s population and family 
15 While I will often refer to the male petitioner with a wife or girlfriend who has been 
forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization, my reasoning applies equally to a female peti-
tioner’s male spouse or boyfriend who has been forced to undergo sterilization. This reason-
ing is also accepted by several circuit courts. See, e.g., Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 303 n.5.  
16 See Mina Chang, Tipping the Scale: Gender Imbalance in China, HARV. INT’L REV.
(Spring 2008), http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1735; see also Population 
and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President No. 63), 
Dec. 29, 2001, available at http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.htm 
[hereinafter Population and Family Planning Law].  
17 See Associated Press, Premier Says China to Continue with One-Child Policy, INT’L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 27, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/27/
asia/AS_GEN_China_One_Child_Policy.php; see also Congressional-Executive Commis-
sion on China, 2005 Annual Report: Monitoring Compliance with Human Rights (2005), 
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/index.php [hereinafter 2005 
Annual Report]. 
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planning laws advocate that each married couple have only a single child, 
the law also allows a married couple to have a second child if they make the 
appropriate requests and satisfy the necessary formalities, which are subject 
to regulation by local, provincial, and municipal governments.18 For exam-
ple, in order for an urban couple to be allowed a second child, both parents 
must be the products of one-child families.19 Other couples facing “genuine 
difficulties,” particularly rural couples, whose first child was a girl, and 
ethnic minorities may also seek permission to have a second child by satis-
fying particular policy control requirements.20 In addition to advocating the 
one child per couple policy, the law “maintains its current policy for repro-
duction” by “encouraging late marriage and child bearing.”21 Under the 
marriage laws of China, the legal age for marriage is twenty-two for men 
and twenty for women.22
B. Enforcement of China’s Population Control Policies 
China’s population and family planning law specifically prohibits 
“oversimplified and uncivilized” approaches to implementing birth control 
policies, particularly: (1) illegally performed operations related to family 
planning (i.e., forced abortions and involuntary sterilizations), (2) fetal 
gender identification techniques for non-medical purposes (such as popula-
tion control) or sex selective abortions, and (3) fake birth control operations, 
false medical reports, or counterfeit certifications of family planning (for the 
purposes of coercive population control); and it declares that those who 
engage in such activities will be fined and punished.23 Despite the law’s 
clear disapproval of such activities, local authorities continue to use physi-
cal coercion to ensure compliance with China’s strict family planning poli-
cies and to keep the birth rate down.24 Thus, implementation and enforce-
18 See Population and Family Planning Law, supra note 16, ch. III, art. 18. 
19 See China Steps Up ‘One Child’ Policy, BBC NEWS, Sept. 25, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/941511.stm.  
20 Id. 
21 Population and Family Planning Law, supra note 16, ch. III, art. 18. 
22 See Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China (1980) (amended 2001), available 
at http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/lsqz/laws/t42222.htm.
23 See Population and Family Planning Law, supra note 16, ch. VI, art. 36. 
24 Local authorities particularly use illegally performed operations related to family plan-
ning and fetal gender identification for non-medical purposes. See Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada, China: Whether Forced Abortion or Sterilizations are Still Occurring: 
Prevalence and Location of Forced Abortions or Sterilizations; Reports of Forced Steriliza-
tion of Men, UNHCR REFWORLD, May 10, 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=updates&docid=46fa5379c [hereinafter Immigration 
and Refugee Board of Canada]; see also 2005 Annual Report, supra note 17; see also U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, China: Information on Return to China After Having 
Children Abroad, Jan. 21, 2004, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/ric/do
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ment of China’s family planning policies can be divided into two broad 
categories: (1) legislated, noncoercive techniques, and (2) nonlegislated, 
coercive techniques. This section initially focuses on the noncoercive tech-
niques (which are mainly economic incentives) and then highlights the 
coercive practices illicitly employed by Chinese officials to comply with 
population control standards. Finally, this section discusses the effects of 
such techniques on China’s population.  
1. Noncoercive techniques 
China’s noncoercive family planning techniques include economic 
and social incentives and disincentives, as well as educational policies and 
media propaganda.25 Citizens who comply with China’s family planning 
policies are rewarded with “longer nuptial and maternity leaves” and special 
occupational protections and subsidies.26 Couples who volunteer to have a 
single child in their lifetime are designated a “Certificate of Honor Single-
Child Parents” and are given larger living quarters, better child care, and 
other rewards from local officials.27 The Chinese government has also 
called on family planning and healthcare professionals to provide citizens in 
different reproductive age groups with “basic knowledge about the popula-
tion program and family planning, provide pregnancy check-ups and fol-
low-ups for married women of reproductive age, [and to] offer advice and 
guidance and provide technical services in respect of family planning and 
reproductive health.”28 The media are also required to publicize population 
control and family planning initiatives.29 The noncoercive penalties for non-
compliance with family planning policies may include fines called “social 
compensation fees,” demotions, loss of employment, destruction of housing 
or other property, higher school tuition, denial of social services, and expul-
sion from the Communist Party.30
cumentation/ CHN04001.htm [hereinafter U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services]; see 
also Edward Cody, Birth Control Sparks Riots in China, WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18812874.  
25 See Population and Family Planning Law, supra note 16, ch. II, art. 13; Erin Bergeson 
Hull, Note, When is the Unmarried Partner of an Alien who has Been Forcibly Subjected to 
Abortion or Sterilization a “Spouse” for the Purpose of Asylum Eligibility? The Diverging 
Opinions of Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft, 25 UTAH L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2005). 
26 See Population and Family Planning Law, supra note 16, ch. IV, art 25. 
27 Id. ch. IV, art. 27; see Hull, supra note 28, at 1025. 
28 Population and Family Planning Law, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 33. 
29 See id. ch. II, art. 13.
30 See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, supra note 27; see also Hull, supra
note 25, at 1025; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 24. Some commen-
tators, however, consider the destruction of homes and the fines for noncompliance with 
China’s population control policies to be exorbitant thereby constituting economic forms of 
coercive punishment. See View from the Inside, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
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2.  Coercive techniques 
Going beyond the above-described techniques, coercive techniques 
illicitly used by local authorities to limit population control have created “an 
atmosphere of fear in which most women feel they have little choice but to 
comply” or else their families will suffer.31 In addition to the economic and 
occupational punishments for noncompliance, local officials also use public 
pressure and dangerous medical procedures to ensure compliance.32 Popula-
tion control centers often: (1) employ a network of paid informants to report 
the unauthorized pregnancies of their neighbors and loved ones; (2) keep 
records of the sexual history of every woman within their jurisdiction; (3) 
target unauthorized babies for extermination; and (4) publicly display 
monthly summaries of every woman’s birthday, marriage date, menstrual 
cycle, and births for villagers to see.33 The most repressive population con-
trol practices include mandatory intrauterine device (IUD) insertions, forced 
late-term abortions, and involuntary sterilizations.34 However, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to determine the pervasiveness of such practices, presum-
ably because they are covert or because Chinese officials turn a blind eye to 
them.35
3. Effect of China’s population control policies 
As a result of China’s family planning policies, “the average num-
ber of children of a Chinese family has dropped from 5.8 in the early 1970s 
to 1.8” in 2005.36 In 2008, China’s total fertility rate (the number of births 
per woman) was estimated at 1.77, which is lower than the United States’ 
estimated rate of 2.1.37 Additionally, the government-sought effects of Chi-
na’s population control policies include an estimated 300 million births pre-
vented over the first 20 years and a delay in China’s population growth by 
31 2005 Annual Report, supra note 17, at 76. 
32 See Hull, supra note 25, at 1025; see also id.
33 See View from the Inside, supra note 1. 
34 See Hull, supra note 25, at 1025–26; see also Immigration and Refugee Board of Cana-
da, supra note 24. 
35 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 24. 
36 China to Continue its Population Control Policy, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2005, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/06/eng20050106_169767.html.  
37 CIA, The World Factbook: China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/print/ch.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2009); CIA, The World Factbook: United States, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/us.html (last visited Mar. 
12, 2009). The U.S. figure is used as a point of comparison.  
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at least four years.38 But even if slowing population growth is seen as posi-
tive, the population control policies also have had negative effects on Chi-
na’s social outlook and population by causing “a stark gender imbalance,” 
“lack of effective pension and social welfare systems for senior citizens,” an 
increasing rate of female suicides, and a rise in human trafficking.39 Despite 
these negative impacts on China’s population, Chinese officials vow to con-
tinue to adhere to current population control policies and consider them to 
be “crucial to China’s modernization and the building of a ‘harmonious 
society.’”40
II. UNITED STATES’ APPROACH TO CHINA’S COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING 
POLICIES
Because of domestic opposition to human rights violations such as 
China’s coercive family planning policies, the United States has enacted 
legislation to protect victims of coercive population control practices. Part A 
of this section examines the relevant asylum legislation enacted by the Unit-
ed States government. Part B highlights the United States’ specific measures 
to counteract coercive population control policies, particularly the amend-
ment to the definition of “refugee” to include victims of forced abortions 
and sterilizations.  
A.  United States Asylum Legislation 
As China has continued to employ its coercive family planning pol-
icies, the United States has taken legislative steps to aid victims of persecu-
tion, particularly through asylum relief. In order to gain asylum, an alien 
must be considered a “refugee” under the INA.41 The INA defines a refugee 
to include:  
[An individual] who is outside any country of such person’s nationality,     
. . . is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and 
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution 
38 See Hull, supra note 25, at 1025; see also China to Continue its Population Control 
Policy, supra note 36 (noting that the “effects” are positive in that they have helped China to 
curb its population boom). 
39 According to the 2000 census, approximately 117 males are born for every 100 females. 
Dewey, supra note 4; see also Infanticide and Forced Abortions Rampant in China, supra
note 1; Associated Press, supra note 17. Critics of the policy attribute the gender imbalance 
to China’s “traditional preference to boys.” China Steps Up ‘One Child’ Policy, supra note
19.
40 Associated Press, supra note 17. 
41 See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2005). The INA 
“vests the Attorney General with the discretionary authority to grant asylum to any alien who 
is a refugee.” Id.
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or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, natio-
nality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.42
Thus, essentially three elements are necessary to satisfy the refugee defini-
tion: (1) a subjective fear of harm supported by objective conditions; (2) a 
form of harm or punishment rising to the level of persecution; and (3) an 
explanation for such mistreatment demonstrating that it is motivated, at least 
in part, by the persecutor’s interest in quashing what it considers to be an 
offensive belief or characteristic.43
Although coercive population control policies persisted in China, 
the INA did not directly address whether such policies were persecutive 
enough to satisfy the requirements for refugee status. Then, in 1989, an im-
portant development in asylum legislation occurred with the BIA decision 
of In re Chang, which held that China’s one-child policy was not “on its 
face persecutive,” and that forced sterilization does not constitute “persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”44 Following this decision, victims of 
China’s coercive family planning policies were not considered refugees. 
Despite congressional disapproval of In re Chang and President George 
H.W. Bush’s 1990 Executive Order calling for immigration laws to have 
“enhanced consideration . . . for those individuals expressing fear of perse-
cution related to their home country’s policy of forced abortion and sterili-
zation,” the BIA continued to follow the precedent set forth in In re Chang 
until 1996.45
B.  The Refined Definition of “Refugee” 
Although President George H. W. Bush and members of Congress 
faced considerable difficulties in providing protections to victims of China’s 
population control policies, the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the 
1993 Long Island grounding of a ship of individuals fleeing China’s coer-
cive family planning policies enhanced the United States’ awareness of 
China’s policies and provided the United States with the motivation for 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
43 See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 921 (Rosenberg, J., concurring) (B.I.A. 1997). 
44 In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43 (B.I.A. 1989), superseded by statute, Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601, 110 
Stat. 3009-689 (1996).  
45 Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (Apr. 13, 1990); see Nicholas Cutaia, 
Note, A Circuit Split on Judicial Deference: Interpreting Asylum Claims by Fiancés and 
Boyfriends of Victims of China’s Coercive Family Planning Policies, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1307, 1312 (2006). 
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change.46 In 1996, Congress amended section 1101(a)(42) of the INA by 
passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA).47 Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA specifically provides victims of 
coercive population control policies a legal basis for asylum by expanding 
the definition of “refugee” to include:  
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo invo-
luntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to 
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population 
control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of 
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she 
will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for 
such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded 
fear of persecution on account of political opinion.48
While the IIRIRA initially permitted only 1,000 aliens per year to 
receive asylum under this provision, the cap was abolished in 2005 by the 
Real ID Act.49
Subsequently, In re Chang was superseded by In re X-P-T, which 
held that “[a]n alien who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo 
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for resistance to a 
coercive population control program, has suffered past persecution on ac-
count of political opinion and qualifies as a refugee within the amended 
definition of that term under section 1101(a)(42) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.”50
46 See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 973–74. The Tiananmen Square massacre occurred on June 
4, 1989 when several student protesters were slaughtered when they challenged communism 
and called for democracy. See 1989: Massacre in Tiananmen Square, BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2009); see also JOHN S. AIRD, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: COERCIVE 
BIRTH CONTROL IN CHINA 2 (1990) (“[I]t was the brutal slaughter of student protesters in 
Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, that revealed more clearly than any previous outrage 
how little regard the present leadership has for human rights.”). 
47 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 601(a), 110 Stat. 3009-689 (1996). 
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).   
49 See Real ID Act of 2005, tit. I, § 101(g)(2), Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5) (2006)); see also Shi Liang Lin, 416 F.3d at 188 n.1; Raina 
Nortick, Note, Singled Out: A Proposal to Extend Asylum to the Unmarried Partners of 
Chinese Nationals Fleeing the One-Child Policy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2165 (2007) 
(arguing that derivative asylum rights should be extended to all Chinese nationals fleeing 
China’s coercive population control programs, regardless of marital status). The INA was 
amended through the Real ID Act of 2005 to provide that “in the absence of an explicit ad-
verse credibility finding, ‘the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of 
credibility on appeal.’” Lin v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 191 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007).  
50 In re X-P-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 634, 634 (B.I.A. 1996). 
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III. JUDICIAL APPROACH AND EVOLUTION
Following the amendment to the refugee definition by the IIRIRA, 
the BIA and several circuits have debated the scope of section 601(a) and 
whether it extends to individuals who had not personally endured a forced 
abortion or involuntary sterilization. Part III (A) of this Note discusses the 
administrative protocol required when circuit courts review the statutory 
interpretations of administrative agencies under the Chevron analysis. Part 
B discusses In re C-Y-Z-, in which the BIA set a ten-year precedent by ex-
tending asylum protection to spouses of victims of forced abortions and 
sterilizations under section 601(a). Part C examines the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuits’ attempts to further extend In re C-Y-Z- to traditionally married 
partners. Part D highlights the Third Circuit’s criticism of extending section 
601(a) protections to traditionally married partners and the Second Circuit’s 
request for the BIA to clarify its holding in C-Y-Z- amid the circuit split. 
Finally, Part E discusses the BIA’s attempt to clarify C-Y-Z- with its deci-
sion in In re S-L-L-.
A. Administrative Deference Under Chevron 
Before examining the interaction of the BIA and several circuit 
court decisions in determining who should be granted automatic asylum 
eligibility, it is important to briefly discuss the level of deference a review-
ing court should give to an administrative agency, such as the BIA, which 
has interpreted a particular statute. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc, the United States Supreme Court provided a two-step 
analysis for reviewing courts to use when determining administrative defe-
rence.51 Under Chevron, when a court reviews an agency’s construction of a 
statute which it has administered, the court must first ask “whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”52 If congressional 
intent is clear, then both the court and the agency “must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” and need not advance in their 
inquiry.53
If, on the other hand, the court concludes that “Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue,” then the court must proceed 
to the second part of the Chevron analysis and ask “whether the agency’s 
answer [to the question at issue] is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”54 If the statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, the 
51 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 842–43. 
54 Id. at 843. 
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court may not “simply impose its own construction on the statute.”55 Al-
though Chevron rejects the concept of a court merely forcing its own con-
struction onto a statute, the Court noted that “[t]he judiciary is the final au-
thority on issues of statutory construction and must reject the administrative 
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”56 Therefore, 
“[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains 
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue that intention 
is the law and must be given effect.”57 The Court also emphasized that the 
rules regarding administrative deference were necessary in creating a me-
chanism “to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”58 When 
Congress expressly leaves a gap in a statutory provision, the agency is given 
controlling interpretive authority over that provision.59 This authority is not 
absolute, however, because the “controlling weight” of an agency’s inter-
pretation may be superseded by a court if the interpretation is “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”60 If legislative delegation 
of interpretive authority is implicit, “a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”61 Thus, although administrative agencies are 
accorded considerable deference in terms of interpreting statutes, courts are 
not completely foreclosed from imposing their interpretation when the ad-
ministrative agency has made an error that is inconsistent with the spirit of 
the statute.
B. BIA Decision: The Precedent of In re C-Y-Z-
As the administrative agency authorized to interpret and apply im-
migration laws, the BIA first discussed the issue of whether an asylum ap-
plicant could establish past political persecution based on his spouse’s 
forced abortion or sterilization in the 1997 case of In re C-Y-Z-.62 In C-Y-Z-,
the petitioner claimed that he was persecuted under China’s population con-
trol policies.63 After the birth of his first child in 1989, the petitioner’s wife 
was forced to obtain an IUD.64 Because the petitioner protested the IUD 
55 Id.
56 Id. at 843 n.9. 
57 Id.
58 Id. at 843. 
59 See id. at 844–45. 
60 Id. at 844. 
61 Id.
62 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8; see also In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 917.  
63 See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 915–16 (B.I.A. 1997). 
64 Id.
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insertion, he was detained for a day.65 When his wife removed the IUD, she 
became pregnant again and was ordered to have an abortion.66 The petition-
er’s wife avoided the abortion by hiding with relatives but returned home to 
give birth to the child in 1990.67 The applicant was fined for noncom-
pliance.68 When his wife became pregnant a third time, she went into hiding 
again but returned home to give birth.69 The applicant’s wife was subse-
quently forcibly sterilized in 1991.70
The BIA held that the applicant “established eligibility for asylum 
by virtue of his wife’s forced sterilization,” and noted that “the husband of a 
sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes.”71 Although the majority 
made no reference to the specific statutory language of the IIRIRA and did 
not explain the basis for its conclusion, it appeared to place considerable 
weight on a memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) written after the IIRIRA was 
passed.72 The memorandum stated that “an applicant whose spouse was 
forced to undergo an abortion or involuntary sterilization has suffered past 
persecution, and may thereby be eligible for asylum under the terms of the 
new refugee definition.”73 Ultimately, the majority based its decision on an 
“agreement of the parties,” which recognized “that the forced sterilization of 
one spouse on account of a ground protected under the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act] is an act of persecution against the other spouse,” and “the 
regulatory presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution that arises 
from a finding of past persecution and the absence of changed country con-
ditions.”74
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 918; See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2006) (“Although Matter of C-
Y-Z- involved a spouse’s forced sterilization, the holding has been understood to apply to a 
spouse’s forced abortion as well.”). 
72 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 917; see Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 225 
(3d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit noted that “[t]he BIA did not . . . identify the specific 
statutory language pursuant to which it deemed spouses eligible for asylum under IIRIRA § 
601(a), nor did the BIA endeavor to explain the reasoning motivating its chosen construc-
tion.” Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2005).  
73 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 917–18 (citing INS memorandum dated October 21, 
1996, entitled “Asylum Based on Coercive Family Planning Policies—Section 601 of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996”). 
74 Id. at 919. 
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C. Ninth and Seventh Circuits Attempt to Extend In re C-Y-Z- to Tra-
ditionally Married Couples 
1. Ma v. Ashcroft: Ninth Circuit 
Following C-Y-Z-, the Ninth Circuit attempted to broaden the scope 
of section 601(a) with its decision in Ma v. Ashcroft.75 The primary issue in 
Ma was “whether husbands, whose marriages are denied recognition by 
virtue of the population control program that Congress has condemned, may 
be deprived of eligibility for asylum on the basis of that denial.”76
In Ma, the asylum applicant was prohibited from entering into le-
gally recognized marriage because he did not satisfy the minimum age re-
quirement of twenty-two years old for males.77 His wife, Chiu, met the age 
requirement of twenty for females because she was twenty-one years old.78
Since Ma and Chiu did not want to wait until Ma turned twenty-two, they 
had a traditional Chinese marriage.79 Shortly thereafter, Chiu became preg-
nant and went into hiding because China’s population control policies pro-
hibited any pregnancy that was not the product of a legally recognized mar-
riage.80 Thus, Chiu’s pregnancy was “subject to termination by forced abor-
tion.”81 When Ma attempted to register his marriage with local officials, he 
was denied and inadvertently informed the authorities of his wife’s illegal 
pregnancy.82 Officials went to Ma’s house and demanded that Chiu comply 
with the abortion procedure.83 When Ma refused, the officials beat him and 
detained his father.84 When Chiu heard of her father-in-law’s detention, she 
pleaded with the Family Planning Office to release him.85 Instead, local 
officials took her into custody, forced her to abort her third trimester preg-
nancy, and imposed a fine on the couple. Ma subsequently fled to the Unit-
75 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 553 (9th Cir. 2004). Section 601(a) specifically 
provides refugee status to the direct victims of forced abortions and sterilizations as a result 
of a country’s coercive population control policies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). In C-Y-Z-
, the BIA extended the asylum protections of section 1101(a)(42) to the spouses of direct 
victims of China’s coercive population control policies. See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 
915.
76 Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d at 559. 
77 Id. at 555. Ma was nineteen years old. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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ed States in hopes of eventually sending for Chiu.86 After being detained, 
Ma filed for asylum.87 Since the BIA denied Ma’s asylum application, the 
Ninth Circuit reviewed Ma’s appeal of the BIA’s decision.  
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s construction of section 
601(a) de novo and asserted that such review was “subject to established 
principles of deference.”88 Essentially, deference is given to the BIA’s rea-
sonable interpretation of a particular provision, so long as it does “not con-
travene other indications of Congressional intent” and does not produce 
“absurd results.”89 The Ninth Circuit court agreed with Ma’s contention that 
“the marriage restriction is an integral part of the policy Congress tar-
geted.”90 Additionally, the court noted that Congress’s goal in passing the 
amendments was “to provide relief for ‘couples’ persecuted on account of 
an ‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.”91 The court 
refused to defer to the BIA’s decision because it contravened the statute and 
led to “absurd and wholly unacceptable results” by breaking families 
apart.92 Thus, the court ruled in Ma’s favor by holding that the statutory 
asylum protection under section 601(a) extends to couples whose marriages 
would be legally recognized but for China’s coercive family planning poli-
cies.93
2. Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales: Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit echoed the holding of Ma in Junshao Zhang v. 
Gonzales,94 by finding that a person who weds in a traditional marriage cer-
emony that is “not recognized by the Chinese government because of the 
age restrictions in the population control measures . . . nevertheless qualifies 
as a spouse for purposes of asylum.”95 Furthermore, that court noted that to 
deny asylum to such an applicant would “entirely subvert the Congressional 
amendment.”96 While the court recognized the applicant’s wife as a victim 
of persecution, it also noted that the applicant also suffered at the hands of 
China’s population control measures because he was deprived of his unborn 
86 Id.  
87 Id.
88 Id. at 558. INA § 1101(a)(42), (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)) contains section 601(a) of the 
IIRIRA).
89 Id. See supra Part III.A.  
90 Ma, 361 F.3d at 555. 
91 Id. at 559. 
92 Id. at 559–61. 
93 Id. at 561. 
94 See Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 993 (7th Cir. 2006). 
95 Id. at 999. 
96 Id. 
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child, the ability to realize the family that he and his wife desired, and the 
ability to ever become a parent to that unborn child with his wife.97
D.  Keeping it Legal: The Third Circuit and the BIA Limit Automatic 
Asylum to Legally Married Spouses While the Second Circuit Calls 
for Clarification 
1. Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft: Third Circuit 
Shortly after Ma, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of extending 
automatic asylum eligibility to unmarried partners of victims of China’s 
coercive population control policies. In contrast to Ma, however, Cai Luan 
Chen v. Ashcroft ultimately held that “the BIA’s decision not to extend C-Y-
Z- to unmarried partners [was] reasonable.”98 Thus, the Third Circuit de-
ferred to the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a). 
In Cai Luan Chen, the petitioner argued that he was eligible for asy-
lum based on his fiancée’s forced abortion due to China’s population con-
trol practices.99 Although Chen and his fiancée, Chen Gui, lived together, 
their application for a marriage license was denied because they had not 
reached the legal age to marry under Chinese law.100 Chen Gui became 
pregnant.101 Shortly thereafter, Chinese officials found out about the preg-
nancy and demanded that Chen Gui have an abortion.102 Chen Gui went into 
hiding and Chen fled the country.103 While in the United States, Chen 
learned that his fiancée had been forced to abort her pregnancy.104 Chen 
argued that the BIA’s decision in C-Y-Z- to limit per se asylum to married 
persons was “irrational and arbitrary and must be rejected.”105
The immigration judge initially held in Chen’s favor and concluded 
that, although Chen did not obtain a formal marriage, his case was analog-
ous to the C-Y-Z- case.106 The BIA reversed the immigration judge’s deci-
97 Id. at 1001.  
98 See Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). The Third Circuit’s 
reasoning for granting deference to the BIA’s interpretation was followed by the Fifth Circuit 
in Zhang v. Ashcroft. See Ru-Jian Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004). In 
Ru-Jian Zhang, the court also found Ru-Jian Zhang’s situation distinguishable from the 
situation discussed in Ma because “Zhang and his girlfriend neither formally nor informally 
married.” Id. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit declined to analyze the issue raised in Ma. Id.  
99 See Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 222. 
100 Id. at 223. Chen was 19 and Chen Gui was 18. Id.  
101 Id.
102 Id. 
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 222. 
106 Id.
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sion on grounds that C-Y-Z- had not been extended to include unmarried 
partners and that Chen’s experience did not constitute past persecution.107
In Cai Luan Chen, the Third Circuit upheld the BIA’s determina-
tion, thereby contrasting the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ma.108 The Third 
Circuit concluded that the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a) was en-
titled to Chevron deference.109 Although the court refused to decide whether 
C-Y-Z-’s interpretation of section 601(a) was “permissible,” the court did 
note that the mere fact that the BIA’s use of marital status as a bright line 
standard was “undoubtedly both over- and under- inclusive” was not alone 
“sufficient to render the use of a metric like marital status irrational.”110 The 
Third Circuit also pointed out that the marital status standard promoted ad-
ministrative convenience and efficiency in light of the BIA’s “crushing ca-
seload” because marital status “can often be proven easily and reliably 
through objective documentary evidence such as marriage certificates or 
‘household registration booklets.’”111
After acknowledging that the BIA did not explain its basis for ac-
cepting the proposition of C-Y-Z-, the Third Circuit provided two possible 
rationales for the BIA’s conclusion.112 The first justification was based on 
the assumption that the persecution of one spouse through a forced abortion 
or sterilization causes the other spouse to “experience intense sympathetic 
suffering that rises to the level of persecution.”113 The Third Circuit noted, 
however, that such an interpretation would face difficulties in terms of 
spouses who did not directly undergo the procedure but sided with the gov-
ernment and favored the abortion or sterilization.114 The second possible 
rationale was the impact on a husband’s ability to reproduce and raise child-
ren as a result of his wife’s involuntary abortion or sterilization.115
107 Id.
108 Id. at 235. 
109 Id. at 224. 
110 Id. at 227. The court recognized that Chen’s situation indicated the underinclusive as-
pect of the C-Y-Z- holding with regards to “a narrow but sympathetic class” but that “a rule 
is not irrational just because it is underinclusive to some extent.” Id. at 230. The court noted 
that several areas of law use marital status as a benchmark, including income tax, welfare 
benefits, property, inheritance, and testimonial privilege. Id at 227 n.6.
111 Id. at 228–29. The court further noted that extending automatic asylum to nonspouses 
“would create numerous practical difficulties,” particularly the problem of proving paternity 
and “the difficulty of determining the ‘genuineness’ of emotional harm felt by one upon 
hearing the harm to his fiancée.” Id at 228–29 n. 8.
112 Id. at 225. 
113 Id.
114 Id. at 226. 
115 Id.
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The Cai Luan Chen court also acknowledged the disparity between 
its holding and the reasoning in Ma. The Third Circuit disagreed with Ma’s
determination that the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a) was contrary to 
Congress’s intent. The Third Circuit inferred that Congress intentionally left 
that definition of persecution unclear in order to provide the BIA with “in-
terpretive authority . . . to decide . . . the precise contours of its meaning.”116
Furthermore, the Third Circuit determined that, in light of the IIRIRA’s 
imposition of an annual cap of 1,000 on the number of aliens that may gain 
asylum under the 1996 amendment, “[t]he BIA’s interest in promoting ad-
ministrability and verifiability is sufficient to clear the low hurdle presented 
by the step two standard [of Chevron].”117 In examining the congressional 
intent regarding the IIRIRA, the Third Circuit found that it was “highly un-
likely” that Congress would broaden the concept of “persecution” for indi-
viduals suffering under coercive population control programs “while con-
temporaneously imposing a yearly cap strictly circumscribing the relief 
available to them.”118 Thus, Cai Luan Chen limited per se asylum protection 
to legally married spouses.  
2. The Second Circuit’s Request for Clarification: Shi Liang Lin v. 
United States Department of Justice (Lin I) 
In light of the contrasting positions of other circuits regarding the 
extension of asylum protection to unmarried partners of victims of forced 
abortion and sterilization at the hands of Chinese officials, the Second Cir-
cuit called for a review of the BIA’s rationale in C-Y-Z- and clarification of 
the qualifications for asylum under section 601(a). In Shi Liang Lin, three 
petitioners, two boyfriends and one fiancée, challenged the immigration 
judge’s denial of their asylum applications based on the victimization of 
their respective partners due to China’s coercive population control practic-
es.119 Shi Liang Lin claimed that he suffered persecution in China when his 
girlfriend was forced to abort her pregnancy because she did not meet the 
age requirements for a legal marriage.120 In Xian Zou’s petition, he also 
maintained that he suffered as a result of his girlfriend’s involuntary abor-
tion and that he also “vocally protested” his girlfriend’s forced abortion.121
116 Id. at 232. 
117 Id. at 229. See supra Part III.A for a summary of Chevron. The 1,000 cap on the number 
of aliens that may gain asylum under the IIRIRA was abolished by the Real ID Act. See Real
ID Act of 2005, tit. I, § 101(g)(2), Pub. Law 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1157(a)(5).
118 Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 223. 
119 See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2005). 
120 See id. 
121 Id. The immigration judge did not consider Zou’s claim that he protested his girlfriend’s 
forced abortion to be credible. Id.
2009] A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 167
Unlike petitioners Lin and Zou, petitioner Zhen Hua Dong sought asylum in 
connection with the two abortions that his fiancée underwent and the threats 
of fines and sterilization against him if his fiancée became pregnant 
again.122 The immigration judge denied all three petitioners’ asylum appli-
cations because the BIA had not extended protection under section 601(a) to 
“fiancées or girlfriends or boyfriends of people who have been forced to 
undergo an involuntary abortion or sterilization.”123 The BIA summarily 
affirmed, without opinion, the immigration judge’s decision in each of the 
three cases.124
Since the BIA summarily affirmed the immigration judge’s deci-
sion, the Second Circuit reviewed the decision of the immigration judge 
directly.125 The court held that the immigration judge’s summarily affirmed 
statutory interpretation of the INA should not be accorded Chevron defe-
rence because immigration judges “lack the jurisdictional power to issue 
decisions that are in any way binding on future parties, on one another, or 
on the BIA” and an immigration judge’s decision “cannot be construed as a 
‘rule’ promulgated by the BIA on behalf of the Attorney General.”126 Al-
though the Second Circuit admitted that it had previously deferred to the 
BIA’s decision in C-Y-Z-, it acknowledged that the BIA had “never ade-
quately explained” its rationale for extending asylum to spouses under sec-
tion 601(a).127 Consequently, the Second Circuit found that it could not 
“reasonably determine the status of boyfriend and fiancée eligibility under 
IIRIRA § 601(a).”128
As a result of the Second Circuit’s refusal to defer to the immigra-
tion judge’s construction of the INA and because of the BIA’s failure to 
articulate its reasoning for the C-Y-Z- holding, the Second Circuit remanded 
this case to the BIA for the BIA to (i) provide a specific explanation for 
making spouses eligible for per se asylum under section 601(a) and to (ii) 
“clarify whether, when, and why boyfriends and fiancés may or may not 
122 Id. at 188–89. The immigration judge found Dong’s claims to be credible but did not 
find him eligible for asylum. Id.
123 Id. at 189. 
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 190 (“[T]he fact that the BIA deems an immigration judge’s decision to be a ‘final 
agency determination’ does not transform the immigration judge’s legal construction into a 
BIA rule carrying the force of law.”). 
127 Id. at 191. The Second Circuit emphasized that it was not suggesting that there was no 
basis for the BIA’s determination but only that the BIA failed to supply adequate justifica-
tion. Id.
128 Id. at 192. The Second Circuit found it difficult to distinguish between spousal eligibili-
ty and boyfriend and fiancée eligibility under IIRIRA § 601(a). Id. 
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similarly qualify as refugees pursuant to IIRIRA § 601.”129 Moreover, the 
Second Circuit retained jurisdiction to rule on the case and “decide the is-
sues on appeal after the disposition of the remand.”130
E. The BIA Clarification of C-Y-Z-: In re S-L-L-
At the request of the Second Circuit, the BIA revisited the issue of 
extending asylum to spouses and unmarried partners of victims of forced 
abortions and sterilizations in China and clarified its position regarding asy-
lum eligibility under section 601(a).131 The BIA reaffirmed its holding in C-
Y-Z- but clarified that the extension of per se asylum is limited to legally 
married partners who are opposed to their spouses’ abortion or steriliza-
tion.132 The BIA based its determination on its belief that Congress was 
“concerned [not only] with the offensive assault upon the woman, but also 
with the obtrusive government interference into a married couple’s deci-
sions regarding children and family.”133 The BIA also noted that married 
couples may suffer as a result of “social ostracism and pressures from Gov-
ernment officials to agree to submit to an abortion.”134 Thus, the BIA found 
that the government persecutes the “married couple as an entity” when it 
forces that couple to have an abortion or sterilization.135 Moreover, the BIA 
noted that, due to the uniquely interconnected nature of the marital relation-
ship, “[a] forced abortion imposed on a married couple . . . has a profound 
impact on both parties to the marriage.”136 The BIA referred to and em-
braced the Third Circuit’s justification for the C-Y-Z- decision to support its 
assertion, specifically that a husband experiences “intense sympathetic suf-
fering that rises to the level of persecution” when his wife is forced to have 
an abortion or sterilization.137
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 1. 
132 Id. at 4. 
133 Id. at 6. The BIA referenced the China’s Population and Family Planning Law which 
“explicitly imposes joint responsibility on married couples for decisions related to family 
planning.” Id.
134 Id. at 6–7. 
135 Id. at 6. 
136 Id. at 7. 
137 Id. Since the law considers the reproductive opportunities of the wife to be “bound up 
with” those of the husband, a forced abortion or sterilization affects a husband and wife’s 
“shared right to reproduce and raise children” such that the persecution suffered by the wife 
could be imputed to her husband. Id. at 7–8. 
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The BIA refused to extend asylum protection to fiancées and boy-
friends based on their partners’ forced abortion or sterilization.138 The BIA 
explained that:  
[T]he sanctity of marriage and the long term commitment reflected by 
marriage place the husband in a distinctly different position from that of an 
unmarried father . . . . [A] husband shares more responsibility in determin-
ing, with his wife, whether to bear a child in the face of societal pressure 
and government incentives than does a boyfriend or fiancé for the resolu-
tion of a pregnancy of a girlfriend or fiancée.139
Like the Third Circuit, the BIA acknowledged that using marriage 
as a bright line standard can be over- and under-inclusive, but noted that 
such a classification “is a practical and manageable approach which takes 
into account the language and purpose of the statutory definition in light of 
the general principles of asylum law.”140 Additionally, the BIA recognized 
the “practical difficulties” that could arise from extending C-Y-Z- to non-
spouses, particularly “[p]roof or presumption of paternity.”141
In addition, the BIA recognized that although an unmarried partner 
is unable to show past persecution on the basis of his partner’s forced abor-
tion or sterilization, he may still pursue asylum by demonstrating persecu-
tion based on “other resistance to a coercive population control program.”142
According to the BIA, “resistance” under section 601(a) includes general 
opposition to a government’s coercive family planning policy, attempts to 
interfere with enforcement of the government’s family planning policy, and 
“other overt forms of resistance to the requirements of the family planning 
law.”143 In addition to proving resistance, an unmarried asylum applicant 
must demonstrate that he endured harm that is sufficient to constitute perse-
cution on account of that resistance.144
In re S-L-L- endorsed the holdings of such decisions as Cai Luan 
Chen v. Ashcroft and refuted the holdings of Ma v. Ashcroft and Junshao 
Zhang v. Gonzales by concluding that only members of legally married 
couples are allowed automatic refugee status based on their spouses’ perse-
cution.145 Since Ma and Junshao Zhang “were rendered before the BIA’s S-
138 Id. at 8. 
139 Id. at 9.
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 10. For example, it may be more difficult for an immigration judge to determine 
whether a boyfriend fathered a child who was forcibly aborted when compared to a legally 
married spouse. Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1.  
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L-L- decision interpreting the spouse requirement in C-Y-Z-,” some courts 
may view them as having “little persuasive value.”146 Even after S-L-L-,
however, the Ninth Circuit, without discussing S-L-L-, noted that it has held, 
“at least for couples who do not meet the age requirements to marry under 
the population control policies, the failure to have an unofficial marriage 
ceremony does not preclude male partners of women who have had forced 
abortions from obtaining asylum under § 1101(a)(42)(B).”147 While a ma-
jority of Third Circuit judges supported the BIA’s determination in S-L-L-
and found that S-L-L- “provided an extensive defense and explanation of its 
determination that ‘a husband whose wife was forcibly sterilized could es-
tablish past persecution’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42),” the Second Circuit 
was not satisfied with the BIA’s reasoning.148 As the next section will high-
light, the Second Circuit concluded that section 601(a) applied only to the 
direct victims of forced abortions and sterilizations. Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit took matters into its own hands and went against the trend of prior cir-
cuit courts and the BIA by providing a less generous, though more accurate, 
interpretation of section 601(a). 
IV. GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN: THE SECOND CIRCUIT DEFIES
PRECEDENT: SHI LIANG LIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LIN
II)
Following S-L-L-, the Second Circuit revisited Lin on appeal and 
considered whether the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a) was cor-
rect.149 The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, faced the issue sua sponte and 
ultimately concluded that the BIA erred in its interpretation of section 
601(a) “by failing to acknowledge the language in § 601(a), [when]viewed 
in the context of the statutory scheme governing entitlement to asylum [i.e., 
§ 1101(a)(42)], . . . is unambiguous and . . . . does not extend automatic 
refugee status to [the] spouses or unmarried partners of individuals [that] § 
601(a) expressly protects.”150 Consequently, Dong’s petition was denied, 
146 Yi Qiang Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 494 F.3d 1311 1318 (11th Cir. 2007). 
147 Zi Zhi Tang v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit made 
a comments similar to that of the Ninth Circuit following S-L-L- regarding its recognition of 
protecting traditionally married couples who would have been married but for China’s popu-
lation restriction. See Hao Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 2006). 
148 Sun Wen Chen v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 491 F.3d 100, 107 (3d Cir. 2004). One Third 
Circuit Judge also found the S-L-L- rationale to be insufficient. Id. at 115 (McKee, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part). 
149 See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin II), 494 F.3d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 2007).   
150 Id. at 300; After admitting that the Second Circuit had previously deferred to the BIA’s 
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) in C-Y-Z- without performing a threshold Chevron
analysis of the ambiguity of the statute, the majority overruled previous cases to the extent 
that they were read to give deference to the BIA’s interpretation in C-Y-Z-. Id. at 305.  
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Lin’s petition was dismissed as moot, and Zou’s petition was dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction.151 Furthermore, the Second Circuit expressed that it 
recognized that its “decision creates a split among the circuits.”152 The fol-
lowing sections of this Note will further examine the rationale and holding 
of the majority in Lin II as well as the concurring opinions. Section A will 
discuss the majority decision which held that section 601(a) asylum protec-
tions do not extend to the spouses or unmarried partners of victims of forced 
abortions or sterilizations. Section B will examine Judge Katzmann’s con-
currence with the majority’s judgment. Section C will highlight Judge So-
tomayor’s concurrence in judgment. Section D will discuss Judge Calabre-
si’s concurrence in part and dissent in part. Section E will focus on the 
events that followed the Lin II decision.  
A.  Majority Decision 
The majority acknowledged that it would apply the Chevron prin-
ciples when reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a).153 Before 
beginning the Chevron analysis, however, the majority attempted to recon-
cile the facts of the case at issue, which involved petitioners who were the 
“unmarried partners, and not spouses, of individuals who have been subject 
to forced abortions,” with its review of the BIA’s interpretation of section 
601(a) (which “extend[ed] a per se presumption of persecution to spouses, 
but not the non-married partners, of individuals who have been involuntarily 
subjected to an abortion or sterilization”) by noting that “[i]t is the existence 
of [the] spousal policy [as interpreted by the BIA] that the petitioners argue 
is an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the statute.”154
Under step one of Chevron, the majority concluded that Congress 
has “unambiguously” spoken on the issue of “whether an individual can 
establish past persecution based solely on his spouse or partner’s forced 
abortion or sterilization.”155 The majority found that Congress intended sec-
tion 601(a) to provide refugee status only to applicants who have undergone 
forced abortions or involuntary sterilizations. The majority based its conclu-
151 Id. at 300. For discussion of the background of Shi Liang Lin, see supra Part III.D.2. 
152 Id. While stating that its decision creates a circuit split, the Second Circuit also noted 
that circuits are already split over “whether § 601(a) provides protection for individuals who 
marry in traditional ceremonies not recognized by their government and later seek asylum 
based on the forced abortion or sterilization of their ‘common law’ spouse.” Id. at 300 n.4. 
153 Id. at 304. 
154 Id. The majority justified its approach further by stating that “[i]f the BIA’s policy is at 
odds with the plain language of the statute, it makes little sense to consider only whether it 
can reasonably be limited to couples who are formally married.” Id.  
155 Id.
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sion on its analysis of the individual clauses within section 601(a).156 The 
majority made the following observations and arguments based on the 
clauses within section 601(a):  
Section 601(a) refers “to ‘a person’ rather than ‘a couple,’ who has 
been subject to a forced abortion or involuntary sterilization.”157
Congress could have easily referred to the “spouse or partner of a 
person who has been physically subjected to a forced procedure” if 
that was its intention.158
Since the language of section 601(a) referred “to individuals who 
have failed or refused to undergo (i.e., ‘submit to’) a procedure affect-
ing their own bodies” and not the forced procedure undergone by 
someone else, “having someone else, such as one’s spouse, undergo a 
forced procedure does not suffice to qualify an individual for refugee 
status.”159
“[T]he use of the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ reinforced the intention of 
Congress to limit the application of the [fourth] clause to individuals 
who are themselves physically forced to undergo an abortion or steri-
lization.”160
Based on the language of the fifth clause and its use of “a person” 
and “he or she,” “it cannot be read reasonably to cover an individual’s 
fears arising from a coercive procedure performed on someone 
else.”161
In addition to reviewing the language used by Congress, the majori-
ty also noted that Congress’s specific inclusion of certain groups “obviously 
result[ed] in the exclusion of others.”162 The majority argued that since 
Congress used “clear and unmistakable language,” when it rejected the 
156 See id. at 305. The Second Circuit numbered the clauses within section 601(a) as fol-
lows:
[ (1) ] a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary steriliza-
tion, or [ (2) ] who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or  
[ (3) ] for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and [ (4) ] a person who has a well founded 
fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or [ (5) ] subject to persecution 
for such failure, refusal, or [ (6) ] resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of 
persecution on account of political opinion.  
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
157 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 305.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 305–06. 
160 Id. at 306. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 307. 
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BIA’s view in Chang by “identify[ing] those to whom asylum could be 
granted” (i.e., those who fear, resist, or undergo particular medical proce-
dures), Congress “reaffirmed the need for direct personal persecution.”163
Moreover, the majority noted that, since section 601(a) does not alter the 
pre-IIRIRA definition of “political opinion,” it “further demonstrates the 
exclusivity of the group of persons entitled to per se asylum under § 601(a)” 
by “creat[ing] a specific exception to the general statutory requirement that 
a person claiming refugee status based on past persecution has the burden of 
demonstrating that the particular conduct experienced by him rose to the 
level of persecution and that the persecution had a specified impermissible 
nexus.”164 Thus, the majority argued, “[i]f the language of § 601(a) indicates 
that the woman who is subjugated to the outrage of a forced abortion has 
not herself been persecuted for the ‘political opinion’ of conceiving a child 
under pre-IIRIRA § 1101(a)(42), then so much less the man who has im-
pregnated her; . . . he is not ‘deemed’ under § 601(a) to hold a political opi-
nion and he must prove the existence of a political opinion or other pro-
tected ground under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).”165
After reviewing the language of section 1101(a)(42) as a whole, and 
section 601(a), the majority attacked “the BIA’s policy of according per se 
refugee status to spouses of individuals explicitly protected by § 601(a).”166
The majority found the “critical defect” of the BIA’s policy to be “its crea-
tion of an irrebuttable presumption of refugee status for a new class of per-
sons,” which “effectively absolve[d] large numbers of asylum applicants of 
the statutory burden to prove that they have (i) a well-founded fear of perse-
cution (ii) based on an impermissible nexus.”167 According to the majority, 
the presumption is impermissible because it is “contrary to the text of           
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)”168 and “beyond the [BIA’s] statutory authori-
ty.”169
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 308 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates 
that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they 
themselves have suffered or must suffer.”). 
166 Id. 
167 Id.
168 Id.  The statute specifies that: (1) the burden of proof is on the applicant; (2) that the 
applicant must establish that political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for 
persecuting the applicant; and (3) that an applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to meet this 
burden only if it refers to specific facts to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. Id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005)). 
169 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 308 (“[T]he BIA lacks authority to adopt a policy that presumes that 
every person whose spouse was subjected to a forced abortion or sterilization has himself 
experienced persecution based on political opinion.”).  
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The majority also attacked the BIA’s decision in S-L-L- because the 
BIA was highly influenced by the long-standing precedent of C-Y-Z- and
numerous circuit court deferrals to C-Y-Z-.170 The majority pointed out that 
“the Supreme Court ‘ha[s] never applied stare decisis mechanically to pro-
hibit overruling . . . earlier decisions determining the meaning of sta-
tutes.’”171
Since the majority concluded that the language of section 601(a) 
was unambiguous, they refrained from deferring to the BIA’s “contradictory 
interpretation” and found “no need to resort to legislative history.”172 The 
majority noted, however, that even if they did refer to legislative history, 
they would find that their interpretation comported with Congress’s intent 
based on the House Report accompanying the amendment. The Report re-
fers to “a person” and “the alien” in order to emphasize that the focus of the 
amendment is on direct victims of persecution, and it mentions several ex-
amples of victims who themselves have had to endure involuntary abortions 
and sterilizations.  However, “spouses,” “significant others,” or “intimate 
friends” of individuals who have been subjected to forced abortions or steri-
lizations are not mentioned.173 Thus, the majority concluded that “[w]hile 
Congress disapproved of coercive family planning policies as a whole, [sec-
tion 601(a)] was meant to provide protection only for “individuals who have 
been subjected to persecution themselves.”174 The majority also reinforced 
its conclusion by noting that “Congress already provides for family mem-
bers elsewhere in the statute by authorizing derivative asylum status for 
spouses and children of individuals who qualify as ‘refugees’” under           
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).175 Finally, the majority found the BIA’s interpre-
170 Id. at 310. 
171 Id.
172 Id. at 309–10. 
173 Id. at 310–11. The House Report accompanying the passage of § 601(a) states that its 
“primary intent . . . is to overturn several decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
principally Mater of Chang and Matter of G- . . . which . . . hold that a person who has been 
compelled to undergo an abortion or sterilization, or has been severely punished for refusal 
to submit to such a procedure, cannot be eligible on that basis for refugee or asylum status 
unless the alien was singled out for such treatment on account of such factors as religious 
belief or political opinion.” Id. at 310 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-469 at 173–74 (1996). 
174 Id. at 310–11 (“Section [601(a)] is not intended to protect persons who have not actual-
ly been subjected to coercive measures or specifically threatened with such measures . . . .”).
The majority also noted the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “refugee” under § 1101(a)(42) 
to mean “‘persecution on account of . . . political opinion’ in [§ 1101(a)(42)] is persecution 
on account of the victim’s political opinion.” Id. at 311 (internal citations omitted). 
175 Id. at 312 (“[U]nder § 1158(b)(3)(A), an individual whose spouse or parent has been 
granted asylum on the basis of having undergone or been threatened with the prospect of a 
forced abortion or sterilization is automatically eligible for derivative asylum: ‘[a] spouse or 
child . . . of an alien who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligi-
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tation of section 601(a) in S-L-L- is incompatible with congressional intent 
because the BIA’s interpretation had “the perverse effect of creating incen-
tives for husbands to leave their wives.”176
Furthermore, because the majority concluded that section 601(a) 
does not provide for a spouse, boyfriend or fiancée to qualify for automatic 
refugee status based on their partner’s forced abortion and sterilization, the 
majority declared that, in order to qualify under the amendment, “an indi-
vidual must turn to the two remaining categories of § 601(a), which provide 
protection to petitioners who demonstrate ‘other resistance to a coercive 
population control program’ or ‘a well founded fear that he or she will be     
. . . subjected to persecution for such resistance . . . .’”177
B. Concurrence in Judgment: Judges Katzmann, Straub, Pooler, and 
Sotomayor 
Judge Katzmann, concurring in judgment and joined by Judges 
Straub, Pooler, and Sotomayor, found it “unnecessary [for the majority] to 
resolve whether the BIA can legally extend asylum relief to legal spouses” 
because: (1) none of the petitioners in these consolidated cases was married; 
(2) the parties in these cases did not even dispute the extension of asylum 
relief to spouses; and (3) this case “could have been resolved simply and 
nearly unanimously by assuming the reasonableness of the BIA’s construc-
tion of the statute as applied to legal spouses and then holding that it was 
also reasonable as applied to boyfriends and fiancés.”178 Thus, Judge Katz-
mann found that the majority had “gone out of its way to create a circuit 
split where none need exist, thereby frustrating the BIA’s uniform enforce-
ment of a national immigration policy.”179
Judge Katzmann found that the majority’s focus on the language of 
section 601(a) to be “misplaced” and that “the entirety of 8 U.S.C.               
§ 1101(a)(42) [should be examined in order] to determine whether the sta-
tute is ambiguous [under the first step of the Chevron analysis].”180 Judge 
Katzmann viewed section 601(a) as an expansion of asylum relief, as op-
ble for asylum under this section, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or 
following to join, such alien.’”). 
176 Id. An example of the perverse effect would be allowing a married man to “‘capitalize 
on the persecution of his wife to obtain asylum even though he has left his wife behind and 
she might never join him and he might intend that she not do so.” Id. (citing Chen v. Ash-
croft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
177 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 309–10. 
178 Id. at 316 (Katzmann, J., concurring).  
179 Id. (“When a governmental body with substantial experience in interpreting a complex 
statutory scheme concludes that a statute is ambiguous, that determination should give us 
pause . . . . Text without context can lead to confusion and misunderstanding.”). 
180 Id. at 317–18. 
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posed to the majority, which viewed section 601(a) as a limitation.181 In 
order to support his arguments, Judge Katzmann noted that nothing in the 
language of section 601(a) indicates Congress’s intent to prohibit the exten-
sion of asylum eligibility relief to spouses and that “Congress has done 
nothing to indicate such an intent in the years since the amendment’s 
enactment.”182
Under the analysis suggested by Judge Katzmann, section 601(a) is 
ambiguous because the statute, on its face, does not directly address the 
precise questions of “whether the spouses of those who have been forced to 
undergo an abortion or sterilization are entitled to asylum relief,”183 whether 
“the emotional and psychological harm one suffers when one’s spouse is 
forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization is . . . severe enough to consti-
tute persecution,” or whether “the statute preclude[s] the BIA from consi-
dering the effect that China’s family planning policies have on a couple’s 
shared right to reproduce and raise children.”184 Therefore, he concluded 
that the BIA must determine such issues and that the majority usurped the 
BIA’s task by “holding that persecution cannot encompass such individu-
als.”185
Under the second step of the Chevron analysis (i.e., whether the 
BIA’s interpretation was based on a permissible construction of the statute), 
Judge Katzmann concluded that “the BIA reasonably considered the general 
principles underlying the definition of persecution and concluded that a 
husband is persecuted ‘when the government forces an abortion on a mar-
ried couple.’”186 Although the BIA created a distinction between legally 
married spouses and unmarried partners by “presum[ing] that the family 
planning officials target[ed] legal spouses for persecution to a greater extent 
than boyfriends and fiancés,” . . . [Judge Katzmann] could not say . . . that 
181 Id. at 319 (“Congress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA § 601(a) was to clarify that, contrary 
to the BIA’s prior rulings, the imposition of some aspects of China’s family planning policy 
can constitute persecution on the basis of political opinion, and that certain victims of that 
persecution are entitled to protection under our asylum laws. Nothing in the amendment 
suggests that Congress intended to prevent the BIA from extending relief to victims other 
than those explicitly identified in the amendment.”). 
182 Id. at 323. Moreover, “[t]here are obscure areas of public policy, largely hidden from 
public attention and concern, in which it makes little sense to ascribe meaning to the absence 
of congressional response to administrative and judicial interpretations of the statute.” Id.
183 Id. at 318. 
184 Id. at 324. 
185 Id. at 325 (“Once we determine that a statute is ambiguous, we must defer to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the statute if it is reasonable, whatever our own personal policy prefe-
rences.”).
186 Id. at 326. Katzmann supported his determination by noting that several court decisions 
“have explicitly recognized that non-physical harm may support a finding of past persecution 
at least in some circumstances.” Id.
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the BIA’s reading is not based on a permissible construction of the sta-
tute.”187
Ultimately, Judge Katzmann held that the BIA’s interpretation of 
the statute was reasonable and “would defer to that interpretation.”188
C. Concurrence in Judgment: Judges Sotomayor and Pooler 
Just as Judge Katzmann declared, Judges Sotomayor and Pooler 
found that the majority chose “to go far beyond [the limited question before 
the court] to address an issue that is unbriefed, unargued, and unnecessary 
to resolve this appeal.”189 Judges Sotomayor and Pooler wrote separately to 
highlight that “the majority’s zeal in reaching a question not before [the 
court] require[d] the unprecedented step of constricting the BIA’s congres-
sionally delegated powers—a decision whose ramifications [the court is] ill-
prepared . . . to understand fully.”190 Furthermore, Judges Sotomayor and 
Pooler found that there was no indication of how personal or direct the in-
jury must be on an asylum applicant under section 1101(a)(42) and “no un-
ambiguous language in the text of § 1101(a)(42) . . . compel[led] the limit-
ing construction of the INA that the majority” posited.191 Consequently, 
under this reasoning, it is within the BIA’s authority to interpret the statute 
as long as the interpretation is reasonable.192 Ultimately, Judges Sotomayor 
and Pooler concurred with the majority’s judgment for the same reasons as 
Judge Katzmann, particularly that the Second Circuit should have followed 
the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Chen (i.e., finding no need to 
reach the question of whether section 601(a) or section 1101(a)(42) were 
ambiguous and that the BIA’s distinction between married and unmarried 
couples was reasonable).193
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 327. 
189 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
190 Id. Sotomayor and Pooler concluded that the majority’s decision “may unduly and inap-
propriately limit the BIA not merely in cases under § 601(a) but in others as well.” Id. 
191 Id. (“It is pellucidly clear from the text of § 1101(a)(42) that Congress did not define 
nor intend to define ‘persecution’ to exclude harms ‘not personally’ suffered by an appli-
cant.”) 
192 Id. Sotomayor and Pooler also argued that the majority’s “misguided exercise in statuto-
ry interpretation” calls the case law of the Second Circuit as well as several other circuits into 
question and may also have started a “domino effect” that may have “significant, unintended 
consequences.” Id. at 331–34. As a result of the “majority’s limiting construction,” the ma-
jority suggests “that the BIA is precluded from ever considering harm to others as evidence 
of persecution to the applicant.” Id. at 332.  
193 Id. at 333.   
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D.  Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part: Judge Calabresi 
Judge Calabresi agrees with the majority’s analysis that “because     
§ 601(a) does not grant [per se] asylum to spouses, it also cannot be read as 
granting asylum to non-spouses—like the petitioners in this case.”194 Judge 
Calabresi, however, partially dissents from the majority opinion that the 
BIA would be impermissibly reading section 1101(a)(42)(A) if it were to 
construe the general definition of “refugee” under section 1101(a)(42)(A) as 
granting per se refugee status to certain categories of people (e.g., spouses 
or non-spouses) because: 
The majority’s argument that the BIA could not, because of Chang,
grant per se status to spouses pursuant to section 1101(a)(42)(A) is an 
illogical inference.195
“There is nothing in the language or history of § 1101(a)(42)(A) that 
suggests that the BIA could not adopt such a per se rule.”196
The majority precluded the BIA from interpreting § 1101(a)(42)(A) 
on the first instance.197
Judge Calabresi also refused to join in the primary concurrence because he 
found that Judges Sotomayor and Pooler also precluded the BIA from 
“thinking deeply and fully on the matter,”198 by arguing that “S-L-L- was 
based, not on § 601(a), but on the general definition of ‘refugee’ found in     
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).”199
Judge Calabresi concluded that the majority properly rejected the 
BIA’s ruling interpreting the coverage of section 601(a), but the majority 
should “now ask the BIA something that it has never been asked by any 
court: What would you do under § 1101(a)(42)(A), given that § 601(a) does 
not give you the authority to do what you did in C-Y-Z- and S-L-L-?”200
194 Id. at 334 (Calabresi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
195 Id. at 335. 
196 Id.  
197 Id. Judge Calabresi noted that such preclusion was “dangerously in tension” with the 
United States Supreme Court’s command in INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 123 
(2002), which held that “[g]enerally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an 
agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.” Id. at 336. 
Judge Calabresi also discussed the majority’s haste in narrowly construing § 1101(a)(42)(A) 
would have “sweeping ramifications” for the Second Circuit’s immigration law docket that 
has 70 to 80 percent of its composition involving Chinese petitioners “seeking asylum to 
escape their homeland’s family planning policies.” Id. at 338 (Calabresi, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  
198 Id. at 343.  
199 Id. at 342.  
200 Id. at 343. Furthermore, Calabrisi noted that, due to the majority and concurrers rush “to 
reach a conclusion in terms of who gets asylum and who does not, [they] sanction bad law 
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Thus, while Calabresi concurred with the majority with regards to: (1) its 
dismissal of Zou’s petition for lack of jurisdiction; (2) its denial of Lin’s 
petition as moot; and (3) its interpretation of “8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(A) as 
being limited to a ‘fundamental change’ in country conditions,” he dissented 
from the majority’s denial of Dong’s petition because an interpretation of     
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) might have covered Dong’s situation.201
E. Congressional and Judicial Reaction to Lin II  
Legislation to amend the INA to include “legally recognized 
spouse[s]” of persons who have been forced to abort a pregnancy or under-
go involuntary sterilization was introduced in the House of Representatives 
on September 17, 2007.202 Unless this legislation becomes law, the Second 
Circuit is still bound by the Lin judgment.203 Based on the Lin decision, the 
Third Circuit recently adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning and interpre-
tation of section 601(a).204 Despite the Second Circuit’s continued adhe-
rence to Lin and the Third Circuit’s acceptance of Lin, it remains to be seen 
how other circuits will react to Lin and its rationale. While the Fifth, Se-
venth, and Ninth Circuits could follow the Third Circuit’s change of heart, 
such a scenario is not guaranteed; these circuits may still retain their posi-
tions until the statue is amended or the issue is decided by the United States 
Supreme Court. In light of the evolving dialogue regarding the interpreta-
tion of § 601(a), it is increasingly difficult to anticipate how circuits that 
have not yet addressed the issue will rule if and when the issue is placed 
before them.  
and bad practices with respect to our relationship with the BIA.” Id. at 343. He admits that 
their rush is “certainly understandable,” but “unnecessary.” Id. at 343–44. 
201 Id. at 344.  
202 H.R. 3552, 110th Cong. (2007).  
203 We are bound by our recent en banc decision in Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice.
See Yong Fu Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2007 WL 2296160, at *1 (2d Cir. 2007); see also
Cheng Yang Lin v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007 WL 2050961, at *1 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Xue Jian Zheng v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2309790, at *1 (2d Cir. 2007); Yu Ye Chen v. Gon-
zales, 2007 WL 2398509, at *1 (2d Cir. 2007); Bao De Weng v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 
2492095, at *2 (2d Cir. 2007).  
204 Guang Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General of the U.S., 2009 WL 398257, at 1, 8 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“[W]hile interpreting § 601(a), the BIA ‘put aside’ the very statutory text that should 
have controlled its inquiry into congressional intent.”). 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section argues that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of sec-
tion 601(a)205 was correct but that section 601(a) should be amended and 
extended to protect both the legally recognized spouses and the traditionally 
married, cohabiting partners of the victims of forced abortions and steriliza-
tions. Part A uses evidence from the statutory language, statutory scheme, 
and the legislative history of section 601(a) to argue that the Second Cir-
cuit’s interpretation was accurate. Part B (1) claims that the amendment to 
section 601(a) would further promote the congressional intent of family 
unification. Part B (2) maintains that expanding section 601(a) protections 
to legally recognized spouses and traditionally married, cohabiting spouses 
would not heighten the threat of fraudulent claims by asylum applicants. 
Part B (3) argues that, without an amendment to section 601(a), traditionally 
married, cohabiting partners would have to resort to ambiguous and inade-
quate alternatives in order to gain asylum eligibility. Part B (4) claims that 
arguments in favor of amending section 601(a) would not be unpersuasive 
or deterred simply because of derivative asylum protections covered under 
other statutes.
A. Second Circuit Majority was Correct in its Analysis of Section 
601(a)
The Second Circuit majority’s conclusion that the language of sec-
tion 601(a), when viewed in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), is unam-
biguous and does not extend automatic refugee status to the spouses or un-
married partners of individuals who have undergone forced abortions or 
involuntary sterilizations is a valid and appropriate interpretation of section 
601(a) based on the well-established canons of statutory construction.206
The majority’s conclusion was based on the following four principles: (1) 
“begin with the language employed by Congress and [assume] that the ordi-
nary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose,”  
(2) “begin with understanding that Congress says in a statute what it means 
and means in a statute what it says there,”207 (3) the statutory scheme en-
compassing section 1101(a)(42); and (4) the legislative history of section 
601(a). 
205 The Second Circuit interpreted section 601(a) as protecting only those individuals who 
have personally suffered a forced abortion or sterilization due to China’s coercive population 
control policies. See discussion supra Part IV.  
206 See Lin II, 494 F.3d at 300. I base my arguments on the majority’s conclusion despite 
the concurrers’ apprehension about the Second Circuit majority’s ability to review the BIA’s 
interpretation of § 601(a) to extend to the spouses, but not the unmarried partners, of individ-
uals who have been involuntarily subjected to an abortion or sterilization. 
207 Id. at 305. 
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The majority initially examined the plain language of section 601(a) 
by analyzing the individual clauses of section 601(a) and referring to the 
language within those clauses which expressly indicates that Congress in-
tended “to limit the application of the clause[s] to individuals who are them-
selves physically forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization.”208 The use 
of such pronouns as “person,” “he,” and “she” as well as the terms “under-
go” and “deem” within the language of section 601(a) (and throughout sec-
tion 1101(a)(42)) are clear indications that section 601(a) refers to the per-
secution suffered by the individual who underwent the forced abortion or 
sterilization. Furthermore, “Congress’s statements neither expressly nor 
implicitly include[d] a marriage requirement” nor any mention of the vic-
tim’s spouse or significant other.209
In terms of the canon that Congress expresses its intention through 
what it states expressly, the specific designation of asylum protections to 
some persons under section 601(a) implies the exclusion of those protec-
tions to others.210 In section 601(a), Congress never referred to spouses, 
significant others, or any other individual or relationship apart from that of 
the individual who personally endured an involuntary procedure based on 
the population control program of a particular country. Congress could have 
easily drafted section 601(a) to extend to the spouses (or unmarried part-
ners) of victims of forced abortions or involuntary sterilizations if that was 
its intention.211 Although the Third Circuit has claimed that the BIA’s inter-
pretation of section 601(a) was reasonable since the BIA was permissibly 
filling in a “gap” left by Congress,212 such an argument is unconvincing 
because the plain language of section 601(a) is clear and the BIA’s interpre-
tation conflicted with the plain language of section 601(a).213 Although the 
statute did not refer to spouses (or unmarried partners), the statutory lan-
208 Id. at 305–06; see Thom v. U.S., 283 F.3d 939, 943 (2006) (“In determining whether a 
statutory exception applies, we look first to the statute’s plain language.”); see also Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (interpreting 
the “well-founded fear of persecution” language from section 1101(a)(42)). 
209 Nortick, supra note 49, at 2184. 
210 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 307; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431 (“With regard to 
this very statutory scheme, we have considered ourselves bound to assume that the legislative 
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”) (quotations omitted). 
211 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 307; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 453 (“Where the lan-
guage of [a] law[] is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative in-
tent.”); see also Sun Wen Chen v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 491 F.3d 100, 115 (3d Cir. 2004). 
212 See Sun Wen Chen, 491 F.3d at 107 (“Silence on a particular matter germane to the 
provisions of the statute suggests a gap of the sort that that the administering agency may 
fill.”). 
213 See Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 
(1992) (“If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statue, 
deference is due.”). 
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guage was otherwise clear that the statute was directed only towards the 
individuals who personally underwent forced abortions and sterilizations. 
Essentially, there was no need for the BIA to fill in the gaps of section 
601(a) because there were no gaps to fill. The language used in section 
601(a) was unambiguous because there was only one reasonable interpreta-
tion of section 601(a).214 For instance, the use of “a person,” “he,” and “she” 
apparently refers to a single individual and does not, on its face or in the 
context of the entire statute, indicate other interpretations such as extension 
to the spouse or marital entity.215
The majority noted that a reviewing court should not confine itself 
to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation, but rather it must 
interpret the statutory provision as a “symmetrical and coherent regulatory 
scheme.”216 Therefore, the majority properly recognized the importance of 
considering the whole statute and not merely the section at issue.217 Nothing 
in the definition of “refugee” under section 1101(a)(42) “would permit ‘any 
person’ who has not personally experienced persecution or a well-founded 
fear of future persecution” on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion to obtain asylum, as 
the BIA’s interpretation would permit.218 The exclusivity of the group en-
titled to per se asylum under section 601(a) (i.e., only those individuals who 
have personally undergone the forced abortion or sterilization) is supported 
by the fact that “the language of § 601(a) does nothing to alter the pre-
IIRIRA definition of ‘political opinion’ in § 1101(a)(42).”219 Like section 
601(a), section 1101(a)(42) also uses language such as “a person,” “him-
self,” and “herself.”220 Moreover, the fact that “Congressmen typically vote 
on the language of a bill” and that the judiciary must ultimately defer to “the 
supremacy of the Legislature” provides additional support for the argument 
that the “legislative purpose [was] expressed by the ordinary meaning of the 
214 See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614–15 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Where the language is 
plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and 
the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”). 
215 According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “a” is an indefinite article that can be 
“used as a function word before” a singular noun such as “person” (i.e. “human being”). 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
“She” is defined as “the female one who is neither speaker nor hearer” (pronoun) and “a 
female person” (noun). Id. “He” is defined as “the male one who is neither speaker nor hear-
er” (pronoun) and “a male person” (noun). Id. Thus, any interpretation of the previous terms 
in the context of more than one person would be unreasonable.  
216 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 306–07; See also Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corporation, 529 U.S. 120, 121, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1294 (2000). 
217 See Thom, 283 F.3d at 943. 
218 Lin II, 494 F.3d at 306. 
219 Id. at 307.  
220 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
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words used” in the statute.221 Thus, section 601(a) and section 1101(a)(42) 
both appear to focus on the individual who directly experienced the forced 
abortion or sterilization.  
In addition to the actual text of section 601(a) and its relationship to 
the statutory scheme of section 1101(a)(42), the legislative history of sec-
tion 601(a) also supports the Second Circuit majority’s interpretation of 
section 601(a). The House Report not only uses terms such as “the alien” 
and “a person” but also refers to examples that include the direct victims of 
forced abortions and sterilizations without mention of their spouses or sig-
nificant others.222 Thus, the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a) is “irre-
concilable” with the legislative history.223
Since section 601(a) unambiguously provides per se asylum only to 
the direct victims of forced abortions and sterilizations and the BIA’s con-
struction of section 601(a) was unreasonable based on the statutory lan-
guage, statutory scheme of section 1101(a)(42), and the legislative history 
of section 601(a), the Second Circuit was not required under Chevron to 
defer to the BIA’s interpretation of section 601(a).224
B. Section 601(a) Should be Amended to Include Both Legally Married 
Spouses and Traditionally Married, Cohabiting Spouses 
Although the Second Circuit correctly interpreted section 601(a) as 
applying only to the direct victims of forced abortions and involuntary steri-
lizations, the scope of section 601(a) should be expanded. In addition to 
extending asylum protections to the legally married spouses of victims of 
forced abortions and involuntary sterilizations, as proposed by H.R. 3552, 
asylum protections should also be extended to traditionally married, coha-
221 See U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985).  
222 H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 174 (1995). Although the House Report does mention 
couples who have been fined excessively and had their homes destroyed, couples are not 
specifically mentioned in the House’s discussion of victims of forced abortion or steriliza-
tion. Instead, the report refers to women with unauthorized pregnancies being forced to have 
abortions and both men and women that may be forcibly sterilized. Id. Excessive fines do not 
constitute persecution; coercive measures encompass forced abortions or sterilizations and a 
well-founded fear of such treatment. Id. 
223 See Sun Wen Chen v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 491 F.3d 100, 114 (3d Cir. 2004). 
224 See Nat’l Cable Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 
969 (2005) (“Chevron requires a federal court to defer to an agency’s construction, even if it 
differs from what the court believes to be the best interpretation, if the particular statute is 
within the agency’s jurisdiction to administer, the statute is ambiguous on the point at issue, 
and the agency’s construction is reasonable.”); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447–
48 (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject 
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”). 
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biting spouses of victims of forced abortions and involuntary steriliza-
tions.225 Thus, section 601(a) should be amended to include both legally 
married spouses and traditionally married, cohabiting spouses of victims of 
forced abortions and involuntary sterilizations because: (1) such an amend-
ment would promote the congressional intent of keeping families together; 
(2) such an amendment would not raise the risk of fraudulent claims; (3) the 
“other resistance” alternative of section 601(a) is ambiguous and difficult 
for an unmarried partner to satisfy; and (4) derivative asylum protections 
under other statutes do not undermine justifications for an amendment to 
section 601(a).226
1. Amendment would clearly promote congressional intent of keeping 
families together
The Ninth Circuit declared in Ma that Congress’s goal in passing 
section 601(a) was “to provide relief for ‘couples’ persecuted on account of 
an ‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.”227 An amend-
ment to section 601(a) that extends asylum eligibility protections to legally 
married spouses and traditionally married, cohabiting spouses of victims of 
forced abortions and involuntary sterilizations would promote congressional 
goals of family unification because such relationships support the existence 
of a familial relationship, even in some circumstances where the couple 
225 Traditionally married, cohabiting spouses under my definition encompass individuals 
who would have been married but for China’s minimum marriage age requirements, but who 
have engaged in a marriage ceremony that is recognized by traditional Chinese customs. 
Furthermore, these individuals live with their significant others and, if possible, share in the 
maintenance of each other’s lifestyle (i.e. financial affairs are interconnected and they are 
recognized in their community as a couple). Traditionally married, cohabiting couples may 
further demonstrate their dedication to becoming a committed couple by attempting to regis-
ter as a legally married couple and being rejected because of failure to meet age require-
ments.
226 While my arguments may also be directed toward the Supreme Court and the various 
circuits, the most plausible way to change perspective regarding this issue would be to 
amend the language of § 601(a). The Second Circuit majority also referred to Congress’s 
power to amend § 601(a) if its holding was inconsistent with congressional intent. See Shi
Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Lin II), 494 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (“If this conclu-
sion is inconsistent with Congress’s intentions, it can, if it so chooses, of course, amend the 
statute, as it did when it adopted IIRIRA § 601(a) in response to the BIA’s decision in Matter
of Chang.”). Thus, Congress might be better able to serve its intention of nuclear family 
unification by extending § 601(a) protections to legally recognized spouses and traditionally 
recognized, cohabiting spouses. 
227 Kui Rong Ma, 361 F.3d at 559; See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 174 (1995)  
(“[P]reservation of the nuclear family . . .  should be the cornerstone of our immigration 
policy.”); see also Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006); see also 
Cutaia, supra note 45, at 1326. 
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could not be legally married.228 The actions of such couples may serve as an 
indicator of their intention to commit to (and promote) a familial relation-
ship as a couple either through legal means or in the eyes of their communi-
ty and through their sharing and maintaining of a home together when legal 
marriage is not yet an option for them due to China’s population control 
policies.229 While the BIA based its reasoning about a spousal relationship 
requirement on an antiquated view of “the virtues of the sanctity of procrea-
tion and marriage,”230 it forgets that “[p]arents are equally persecuted part-
ners because they commit to a familial relationship, not because their rela-
tionship is sanctioned by the state.”231 The efforts of these couples to be 
viewed as couples in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of others (in addi-
tion to the actual procreation) help to create “a rough way of identifying a 
class of persons whose opportunities for reproduction and child-rearing 
[would be] seriously impaired or [would] suffer serious emotional injury as 
a result of the performance of a forced abortion or sterilization on another 
person.”232
Furthermore, if asylum relief were extended only to legally married 
spouses (and and failed to protect traditionally married, cohabiting spouses), 
then there would be “absurd and wholly unacceptable results,” particularly 
breaking families apart, because the “early marriage prohibition is inextric-
ably linked to the restrictions on childbirth.”233 Although critics may argue 
that American courts should follow China’s minimum marriage age re-
quirements and, therefore, limit asylum relief to couples who meet the re-
228 See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 989. The primary policy of the preference system of visas 
was the “the reunification of families.” Id. The existence of a familial relationship could be 
proven by a petitioner, even if that petitioner was not married. Id.
229 Thus, “[t]he important inquiry, it seems, ought to be the nature of the relationship be-
tween the asylum applicant and the woman who has been forced to terminate her pregnancy” 
and not (solely) whether the Chinese government recognized the marriage. Hao Zhu v. Gon-
zales, 465 F.3d 316, 325 (7th Cir. 2006) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
230 Sun Wen Chen, 491 F.3d at 115 (McKee, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
231 Nortick, supra note 49, at 2188 (emphasis added). 
232 Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004). Though the Third Circuit 
applied the emotional injury argument to apply to legally married spouses, this argument 
should also be applied to traditionally married, cohabiting couples who intended to obtain a 
legally recognized marriage but were precluded from doing so because of China’s population 
control policies. See id.; see also Nortick, supra note 49, at 2184 (“Congress intended quite 
simply to protect a class of persons who have lost a child as punishment for violating China’s 
family planning law—this class naturally includes married and unmarried couples.”). 
233 Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559–61 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Application of the BIA’s rule 
[of limiting asylum relief to legally married couples] would result in the separation of a hus-
band and wife, the break-up of a family a result that is at odds not only with [§ 601(a)], but 
also with significant parts of our overall immigration policy.”). Thus, the position posited by 
the BIA in S-L-L- and proffered by Congressman Fossella in his proposed amendment to 
section 601(a) would be unsound and undesirable.  
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quisite marriage standards under Chinese law, such compliance would con-
travene Congress’s desire to “give relief to the victims of China’s oppres-
sive population control policy” through section 601(a).234 Moreover, the 
wish to alleviate persecution of asylum applicants rises from the United 
States’ view of legitimate and humane activity, even if such alleviation may 
contravene the policies of the persecuting country.235 While Judge Alito 
noted in Chen that the “marriage relation” is applied to several legal areas 
including “income tax, welfare benefits, property, inheritance, testimonial 
privilege, etc.,”236 he “rigidly ignore[d] the restrictions in China that make 
marriage unattainable for many who wish to marry.”237 Therefore, Alito’s 
analysis and rationale was incomplete.  
Moreover, extension of asylum protection to all unmarried couples, 
or to any cohabiting couple regardless of whether they have obtained a tra-
ditional marriage, would arguably cause absurd and unacceptable results 
because such extensions would ignore the distinction between mere procrea-
tion and the actual intention of a couple to form a familial relationship.238
Such broad asylum protection would be unnecessarily over-inclusive be-
cause it would include many couples that did not desire to enter into a fa-
milial relationship or have a long-term commitment.239 Thus, there is no 
234 Id. at 561 (“[B]ecause the prohibition on underage marriage is an integral part of [Chi-
na’s oppressive population control] policy, it would contravene the fundamental purpose of 
the statute to deny asylum on the basis of that rule.”). But see Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 
230 (“[A]lthough minimum ages of 23 and 25 are contrary to our traditions and international 
practice, we cannot go so far as to say that enforcement of these laws necessarily amounts to 
persecution. American constitutional law recognizes marriage as a fundamental right, but all 
states impose minimum age requirements, and we assume these laws are constitutional.”). 
235 Courts have previously defined persecution as “punishment or the infliction of harm for 
political, religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize as legitimate.” Hao
Zhu, 465 F.3d at 318 (emphasis added). Thus, America bases its definition of punishment on 
its own standards, and not those of another county. Moreover, although American states do 
set marriage age requirements, the punishment for violation of such policies would not be 
coercive. Thus, the connection between China’s marriage requirement and coercive punish-
ment for violating those requirements makes the stakes much higher and distinguishes Chi-
na’s practices from those of America.  
236 Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 227. 
237 Rabkin, supra note 2, at 991 (“It is difficult to see how [a petitioner’s] involuntary legal 
status would diminish the pain and injury of [his] partner.”). 
238 But see Nortick, supra note 49, at 2191 (“The United States should extend derivative 
asylum rights to Chinese nationals fleeing the one-child policy, regardless of marital sta-
tus.”); see also Rabkin, supra note 2, at 992 (“The BIA should . . .  make non-legally mar-
ried, cohabitating partners of victims of coercive family planning, whether married in tradi-
tional Chinese ceremonies or not, as per se eligible for asylum as their legally married coun-
terparts have been since C-Y-Z-.”). 
239 For example, such a broad extension of asylum protection would include individuals 
who had a one night stand or otherwise platonic roommates that may desire to leave China. 
Thus, the problems of paternity would also be heightened because there would be greater 
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need for broad asylum protection of all unmarried couples because, unlike 
Congress’s primary aim in passing section 601(a), there would be no famili-
al relationship to preserve.
2. Amendment would not heighten risk of fraudulent claims 
Several circuits have refused to extend section 601(a) protections 
beyond the direct victims of forced abortions and sterilizations and their 
legally married spouses based on a fear of a heightened risk of defrauding 
the immigration process.240 But amending section 601(a) to extend asylum 
protections to the legally and traditionally married cohabiting spouses of 
victims of forced abortions and sterilizations would not increase the risk of 
fraudulent asylum claims. Since all of this group of asylum applicants must 
satisfy the burden of showing that they suffered persecution in China,241
fears that an amendment to section 601(a) extending protections to legally 
and traditionally married, cohabiting spouses would encourage fraud are 
unfounded. While a legally married applicant may prove a relationship with 
the victim of a forced abortion or involuntary sterilization by providing a 
marriage license and other such official documents, traditionally married, 
cohabiting spouses may prove cohabitation “by producing a household regi-
stry.”242 Potential documentation of a traditional marriage may also be evi-
denced through a document indicating that a traditionally married couple 
was fined for having an early marriage.243
difficulty in determining the level of commitment of the couple. Moreover, a broad extension 
of asylum protection would go far beyond Congress’s intention of providing relief for 
“couples” by providing relief to any two individuals who happen to procreate (or happen to 
procreate and live together). Thus, such an extension would place considerable focus on the 
sexual relationship, which is a relatively casual relationship when compared to the implied 
connotations of long-term commitment associated with the familial relationship. 
240 A distinction between legally recognized spouses and unmarried partners could serve 
the statutory purposes of: “(1) providing a convenient way to weed out cases in which ‘close 
family ties’ were lacking and (2) avoiding ‘problems of proof and the potential for fraudulent 
visa applications.” The Third Circuit also noted that the “problems of proving paternity” 
would also be greater in situations involving unwed partners. See Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 
228; see also Nortick, supra note 49, at 2184–85. While I argue that such concerns would be 
inapplicable to traditionally married, cohabiting couples, these concerns would still apply to 
a broad extension of asylum protection to all unmarried couples or to any cohabiting couple 
regardless of whether they have obtained a traditional marriage.  
241 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469(I), at 174 (“Determining the credibility of an applicant and 
whether the actual or threatened harm rises to the level of persecution is a difficult and com-
plex task, but no more so in the case of claims based on coercive family planning than in 
cases based on factual situations”); see also Nortick, supra note 49, at 2185. 
242 See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 990. The household registry is “an official document listing 
all residents of a dwelling, which the Chinese government requires citizens to submit every 
year.” Id.; see also Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 228–29. 
243 See Ma, 361 F.3d at 556 n.4. 
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Several courts have also recognized that an asylum applicant may 
have difficulty obtaining official documentation from his persecutory home 
country to support his claim for asylum since he may have been forced to 
flee in haste.244 Therefore, such an applicant can support his claim for asy-
lum with little or no documentary support (particularly, relying on his own 
testimony).245
Thus, the “competing goals” of asylum law (i.e., “to harbor those in 
need of asylum while weeding out illegitimate claims”) can best be served 
by amending section 601(a) to protect both the legally recognized and tradi-
tionally married, cohabiting spouses of victims of forced abortions and steri-
lizations.246
3. “Other Resistance” is a difficult and ambiguous alternative for un-
married partners
In re S-L-L- suggested that, though legally married partners may ob-
tain asylum relief based on their spouses’ persecution, unmarried partners 
may obtain asylum based on their own resistance to China’s population con-
trol policy under the “other resistance” option.247 The BIA listed the fol-
lowing as “relevant factors” when considering whether an unmarried partner 
satisfied the other resistance element of section 601(a):  
[whether the couple] has children together, has cohabited for a significant 
length of time, holds themselves out to others as a committed couple, has 
244 See Nortick, supra note 49, at 2185–86; see also Zhou Yun Zhang v. U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, 386 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Because refugees frequently 
leave their native countries under urgent circumstances, the law recognizes that in some 
asylum cases, the only evidence of persecution an applicant may be able to offer will be his 
own testimony. Accordingly, such testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the 
burden of proof.”); Hao Zhu, 465 F.3d at 326 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“Many asylum appli-
cants likely lack proof of a state sanctioned marriage, and even fewer have proof of engaging 
in a ‘traditional marriage ceremony.’”). Zhang also noted that fraud is an ever-present risk 
when reviewing a partner’s claim for asylum based on the forced abortion or sterilization of 
his partner, particularly when the applicant does not possess supporting documentation. See 
Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 72 (“[V]irtually, any young, undocumented Chinese male 
seeking to enter the United States can assert that he is married and seeking asylum based on 
his spouse’s forcible abortion or sterilization.”).  
245 See Nortick, supra note 49, at 2185; Jin Shui Qui v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 150 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (“Specific, detailed and credible testimony and corroborative background evi-
dence, is necessary to prove the case for asylum.”) 
246 Hao Zhu, 465 F.3d at 325 (Rovner, J., dissenting). The factors contained in an inquiry 
determining a partner’s commitment to familial relationship include the following: “is the 
couple at issue involved in a spouse-like relationship where both parties have demonstrated 
an intent to enter into and sustain a long-term partnership for the purpose of raising a child 
together, and but for the persecuting country’s restrictive population control measures, they 
would have married.” Id. 
247 See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (B.I.A. 2006); Nortick, supra note 49, at 2188.  
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taken steps to have their relationship recognized in some fashion . . . , is 
financially interdependent, and [whether] persuasive objective evidence of 
that relationship’s continued existence during the time that the applicant 
has been in the U.S.248
While those factors encompass several of the elements that characterize a 
traditionally married, cohabiting couple, they make it unnecessarily difficult 
for such couples by requiring immigration judges to make “individual find-
ings of fact” based on the closeness of the relationship between traditionally 
married, cohabiting partners.249 Furthermore, since traditionally married 
couples are not sanctioned by the Chinese government and China prohibits 
unmarried couples from having children, it is unlikely that such couples 
would be able to indicate that they had children together.250
Another problem with the “other resistance” option is its ambi-
guousness.251 Although the term “resistance” has not been defined, the BIA 
has asserted that the term could cover several circumstances, “including 
expressions of general opposition, attempts to interfere with the enforce-
ment of government policy in particular cases, and other overt forms of re-
sistance to the requirements of family planning law.”252 Despite the BIA’s 
suggestions regarding the coverage of “resistance,” there is very little case 
law analyzing the “other resistance” clause of section 601(a) and the legisla-
tive history behind section 601(a) does not indicate any clear congressional 
intent regarding the scope of the “other resistance” clause.253
248 In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 10–11. 
249 See Nortick, supra note 49, at 2189. Traditionally married, cohabiting partners would be 
able “credibly testify to persecution and to the closeness of their relationship with their part-
ners if given the chance.” Id.
250 Id. at 2190. Thus, some of the factors listed by the BIA contradict the prohibitions of 
China’s family planning policies.  
251 See Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 312; see also In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 10 (“The 
term ‘resistance’ is not defined in the Act.”). 
252 In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 10. 
253 Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 313; see Zhi Zhi Chen, 2005 WL 2709346, at *3 (7th Cir. 
2005) (acknowledging that there is a “paucity of cases analyzing the meaning of the term 
‘resistance’” and finding that an outburst in a family planning office would not qualify as 
resistance but a doctor’s article that was critical of China’s birth control measures and that 
publicized a practice of hospital infanticide was considered resistance.); see also Zheng Zhou 
v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, No. 04-3157-ag, 2007 WL 2389743, at 
*1 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that applicant’s letter to family planning authorities constituted 
resistance).
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4. Justification for the amendment is not precluded by grant of deriva-
tive asylum protection under other statutes 
While the Second Circuit recognized that “Congress already pro-
vides for family members elsewhere in the statute by authorizing derivative 
asylum status for spouses and children of individuals who qualify as “refu-
gees” under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A),254 such a reference does not “unam-
biguously preclude” an amendment to section 601(a) that provides “an addi-
tional basis of relief” to the legally and traditionally married, cohabiting 
spouses of individuals who have been subjected to a forced abortion or ste-
rilization.255 The language of section 1158(b)(3)(A), though it may cover 
legally and traditionally married cohabiting spouses, arguably serves as a 
catch-all because it applies when an applicant is “not otherwise eligible” for 
asylum under the section. Furthermore, section 1158(b)(3)(A) may not be 
available to the legally recognized spouses or traditionally married partners 
of direct victims of coercive population control practices because such part-
ners usually leave China before their victimized partners; thus, the spouses 
and the traditionally married partners seeking asylum based on the persecu-
tion of their wives would not satisfy the requirements of section 
1158(b)(3)(A) because they are not “accompanying, or following to join” 
their wives and their wives usually have not been previously granted asylum 
status.256
CONCLUSION
Although the Chinese government and the international community 
have officially denounced coercive family planning policies, such as forced 
abortions and involuntary sterilizations of couples who have unauthorized 
pregnancies, such coercive practices continue to be enforced by local offi-
cials and condoned by government inattention. The United States has re-
sponded to China’s coercive population control policies by passing IIRIRA 
section 601(a), which provides asylum relief to those who have suffered 
forced abortions and sterilizations. While the BIA and several circuits have 
254 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A), “[a] spouse or child . . . of an alien who is granted 
asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum under this section, be 
granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien.”          
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2005); see Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 312. 
255 Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 325 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“There is no apparent ten-
sion in providing derivative asylum status to spouses who have not themselves suffered any 
harm and providing an additional basis of relief to those spouses who have, that is, those who 
have themselves suffered harm when their partners were subjected to a forced abortion or 
sterilization.”). 
256 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A); see also Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 331 n.6 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“[I]t is not uncommon for Chinese couples to separate and have one spouse 
go abroad and amass the necessary resources to bring over the other spouse.”). 
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held for ten years that section 601(a) extends to the legally married spouses 
of those victims,257 the Second Circuit has recently narrowed the effect of 
section 601(a) by finding that section 601(a) protects only the direct victim 
of forced abortion or sterilization. The Second Circuit held that 601(a) does 
not automatically extend asylum eligibility protections to the spouse, boy-
friend, or fiancé of a victim of forced abortion or sterilization. The Second 
Circuit’s narrowed interpretation of 601(a) in Lin II ultimately called atten-
tion to the statute’s inadequacy. Even though the Second Circuit was justi-
fied in its interpretation of section 601(a) based on statutory interpretation 
and legislative history, section 601(a) should be amended to extend auto-
matic eligibility for refugee status to both the legally recognized and the 
traditionally married, cohabiting spouses of individuals who have under-
gone forced abortions and sterilizations.  
257 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits extended asylum protection even further, to traditional-
ly married couples who would be legally married but for China’s minimum marrying age 
requirements.
